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IRRESISTIBLE FORCES AND POLITICAL OBSTACLES: 
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM AND THE STRUCTURAL 
REGULATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
John W. Cioffi* 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in reaction to the 
enormous political pressures generated by the wave of corporate 
financial scandals during 2001-2002. The Act’s innovative reforms 
of corporate governance law were shaped by powerful political 
constraints on the use of private litigation and tensions over the 
use of “structural regulation” to alter the internal governance 
structures and procedures of publicly traded corporations. The 
conservative political realignment during 1990s precluded the 
development or expansion of litigious enforcement mechanisms 
(i.e., private causes of action) to curb corporate and managerial 
financial misconduct. Consequently, a number of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act’s core provisions took the form of structural regulation 
intended to function as non-litigious, self-executing mechanisms 
of regulation. Political constraints on the use of private litigation 
as an enforcement mechanism entailed a more direct intervention 
of state power within the corporation and blurred the established 
boundaries between the public and private spheres. However, the 
legislative reforms did not alter the core processes of corporate 
                                            
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Riverside. 
Contact information: Department of Political Science, Watkins Hall, University 
of California, Riverside, 92521, phone: (951) 827-7269, email: 
john.cioffi@ucr.edu. I would like to thank Neil Fligstein, Peter Gourevitch, 
Darius Gaskins, Bob Kagan, Mark Landy, Bronwyn Leebaw, Martin Levin, 
Jonathan Macey, Ulrike Schaede, Peter Schuck, Martin Shapiro, Steven Teles, 
Steven Vogel, Graham Wilson, and Nick Ziegler for their comments and 
encouragement. I would also like to thank Bill Frenzel and Pietro Nivola of the 
Brookings Institution and Thomas Richardson, Esq. of Arnold & Porter for their 
help in facilitating research for this article. All remaining errors are my own. I 
would also like to thank the Academic Senate of the University of California, 
Riverside and the Gordon Public Policy Center at Brandeis University for 
financial support for this research. 
2 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 02 NO. 01 
 
 
managerial power—the nomination and election of directors to the 
board. When the SEC attempted to do so, it threatened 
encroachment on the private sphere and the institutional bases of 
managerial power and autonomy and produced a backlash by 
business elites against further reforms and against the underlying 
logic of Sarbanes-Oxley itself.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20021 was the most significant reform 
of American securities and corporate governance law since the 
New Deal. The reforms are part of a long history of political 
struggle over the form, power, and legitimacy of the corporation 
and financial capital. Yet the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also represents a 
sharp break with nearly two centuries of American federalism and 
established forms of corporate governance regulation. The central 
puzzle of American corporate governance reform is how and why 
Congress passed such significant reform during a politically 
conservative era in which corporate and managerial power were at 
a zenith, and why it took such a novel form. The answer to both 
parts of the puzzle is contextually and historically contingent. 
First, extraordinary conditions of stock market crashes and 
corporate financial scandals temporarily disrupted interest group 
politics and partisan divisions to allow substantial legal and 
institutional change. Second, political constraints on the use of 
litigation as a means of addressing managerial financial fraud and 
abuse impelled legislators to embrace alternative mechanisms of 
regulation as part of the reforms. Financial crisis and political 
constraints provided the conditions for regulatory innovation.  
As forged by post-New Deal regulatory politics and the post-war 
liberal legalism of the 1960s and 1970s, regulation in the United 
                                            
1 Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as scattered 
sections of 11, 15 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). Passed by both the House and Senate on 
July 25, 2002; signed into law by President George W. Bush on July 30, 2002.  
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States is typically highly prescriptive and litigious. Institutionally 
fractured by federalism and the separation of powers, shot through 
with multiple veto points, and lacking the more autonomous 
administrative bureaucracies and neo-corporatist bargaining 
arrangements common in many advanced industrial countries, the 
United States developed a distinctive form of legalistic regulation 
(Kagan, 2001; Keleman, 2004; Cioffi, 2004b). Regulatory politics 
has tended to produce detailed prescriptive rules and enforcement 
through private litigation. This form of legal ordering constitutes 
the private sphere as a broad zone of presumptive autonomy for 
economic actors and defines their relations as predominantly 
those among private parties enforcing private rights through 
litigation. Yet in recent years, political conflict over the scope, 
role, and litigious means of enforcing regulatory norms has grown 
increasingly intense.  
The internal structure and governance of the corporation in the 
United States has long been defined by detailed prescriptive 
transparency and disclosure regulation under federal securities 
law, as well as minimal mandatory legal requirements concerning 
the internal form and operation of the firm under state corporation 
law (Cioffi, 2004a, 2004b). This established pattern began to 
change with the federal corporate governance reforms that 
followed the wave of financial scandals that began with the 
collapse of Enron in 2001. Political theories of regulation would 
predict either that the veto-prone political structure of the United 
States would have allowed powerful interest groups to block 
significant legal and regulatory reforms (cf. Tsebelis, 1995) or, 
alternatively, that reforms would remain within the established 
trajectory of increasingly detailed prescriptive (or proscriptive) 
legal rules reinforced by additional litigation-driven remedies 
(Kagan, 2001). Alternative theories of regulation and economic 
governance proposed by a number of scholars may anticipate new 
forms of law and regulation but do not adequately address the 
political dynamics capable of producing such regulatory 
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innovations.2 This article takes issue with both general theoretical 
perspectives.  
Significant reforms did follow in the wake of the post-Enron 
corporate governance crisis but they did not expand or create new 
avenues for litigation. Instead, many of the reforms passed by 
Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and those later 
adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission took a 
strikingly different path—one that I label structural regulation, 
through the restructuring of institutional and organizational 
arrangements within the private sphere to effect policy goals of 
improved corporate governance, managerial accountability, and 
financial market legitimacy. This article analyzes how and why 
corporate governance reform in the United States overrode interest 
group and partisan politics, departed from the established forms 
and federalist patterns of regulation, and remained cabined by 
political constraints that may limit the effectiveness of regulatory 
innovations.  
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in response to 
the collapse of the American stock markets and the subsequent 
wave of corporate financial scandals during 2001-2002. The stock 
market crashes, dot.com failures, the seemingly endless 
disclosures of financial fraud and manipulation accompanied by 
the largest corporate collapses in American history, represented 
massive failures of market, corporate, and regulatory institutions. 
A crisis of investor confidence and, ultimately, of the broader 
legitimacy of the American political economic order compelled 
                                            
2 There are a wide array of such re-conceptualizations of regulation and the 
regulatory state. See, for example, Teubner, 1983 (“reflexive law”); Stewart, 
1986 (“reconstitutive law”); Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992 (“responsive 
regulation”); Freeman, 1997 (“collaborative governance”); Krawiec, 2003 
(“negotiated governance”). Each in its own way seeks to address the rigidities, 
inefficiencies, conflicts, and other undesirable attributes of regulation in an 
advanced industrial political economy, yet they do not describe how law and 
regulatory politics characteristically work in the United States.  
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Congress to act quickly to pass reform legislation that could never 
have been passed under ordinary conditions.  
The regulatory innovations of the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms were 
shaped by powerful political constraints on the use of private 
litigation to curb managerial financial misconduct. During the 
mid-1990s, hostility towards litigation as a mechanism of legal 
and regulatory enforcement culminated in the passage of federal 
securities litigation reform laws and since then has become an 
entrenched feature of federal legislative politics. Given the 
political constraints on using private litigation, congressional 
proponents of reform could not use traditional litigious 
mechanisms of enforcement to protect shareholder interests. 
Instead, they pursued an incremental federalization of the 
structural components of corporate law as the favored mode of 
regulatory reform. As a result, the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate 
governance legislation employed mechanisms of structural 
regulation that work by altering the institutional structure and 
internal functioning of the corporate form and board of directors, 
rather than rules enforceable through private litigation. These 
structural alterations of the corporation were designed to curb 
managerial abuses through non-litigious, self-executing 
mechanisms of regulation. Sarbanes-Oxley federalized core 
features of corporate law that had long been the province of the 
states. In doing so, the reforms’ use of structural regulation 
revealed the constitutive force of the public sphere, through law 
and regulation, on the ostensibly private sphere of the corporation.  
The exigencies of post-1990s corporate governance reform and the 
political legacy of anti-litigation politics of the 1990s produced a 
paradox: the political constraints on the use of litigious 
enforcement mechanisms led to an even more extensive and 
intensive forms of governmental regulatory power over corporate 
affairs. The inability to use private litigation as an enforcement 
mechanism resulted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s path-breaking 
expansion of federal authority over the internal structure and 
affairs of the corporation and a more direct intrusion of 
governmental power into what had been largely regarded as the 
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autonomous private sphere of the corporate firm. Ultimately, this 
encroachment on the institutional bases of managerial power and 
autonomy, and attempts to build upon it by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, prompted a backlash by business against 
further reforms and against portions of Sarbanes-Oxley itself.  
This article examines the vacillations of American securities 
regulation from the mid-1990s through the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. There are three basic findings: (1) 
under conditions of severe and persistent market failures state 
actors marshaled the political forces driving reform to increase 
regulatory intervention in the private sphere; (2) clashing partisan 
political agendas induced the form of corporate governance 
regulation towards structural regulation; and (3) the failure to 
alter the way in which directors are nominated and elected 
reflected the limits of structural reform and regulation under the 
prevailing conditions of American politics and economic 
organization. These findings are supported by an analysis of 
successive waves of “backlash” politics, in which legislators and 
partisan coalitions seize the initiative before the veto-prone logjam 
of pluralistic American politics reasserts itself. This history is 
presented in three stages. The first covers the politics of securities 
litigation reform of the mid to late-1990s. The second deals with 
the legislative and regulatory corporate governance reforms of 
2001-2004. The last phase encompasses a growing business 
backlash against reform and the expanding regulatory intervention 
in corporate affairs.  
II. ANTECEDENTS OF STRUCTURAL REGULATION IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
A. THE FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM AND THE 
FEDERALIST LEGACY 
Corporation law always had a structural component that 
instantiated the institutional minima of the corporate form and its 
governance. This structural framework has inevitably had a 
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regulatory effect on corporate governance by allocating power and 
influencing the behavior of stakeholders within the corporation. 
Over the course of the 19th and 20th Centuries, the structural and 
fiduciary elements of corporation law became less restrictive and 
increasingly ineffective in constraining managerial and corporate 
actions. Yet as the federal government established a national 
framework of securities law and regulation, the core functions of 
state corporation law in defining the basic corporate governance 
structures and fiduciary duties of directors and officers remained 
intact. Federalism in corporate governance law remained 
surprisingly stable during a long era of federal government 
expansion and regulatory centralization.  
Corporation law has always provided for the minimum structural 
features and requirements of corporate governance. Within the 
constraints of state corporation law, corporate charters established 
the business purposes of the corporation, created the classes of 
stock, and defined shareholder voting rights and procedures. In the 
19th Century, prior to development of modern securities law, 
corporate law was virtually the only body of law governing 
corporate affairs and protecting investors. The powers granted to 
the corporate firm and their structural allocation within it under 
state corporate law constrained managerial behavior. In particular, 
state law restrictions on the corporate ownership of stock impeded 
mergers and acquisitions. New Jersey and then Delaware adopted 
more laissez faire corporation laws which triggered a swift erosion 
of these restrictions on corporate capacities and managerial 
conduct nationwide. This liberalizing “Delaware effect” facilitated 
the first great merger boom in American history at the end of the 
19th Century and shaped the form of managerial capitalism that 
would characterize the United States for a century. However, as 
the strictures of corporation law loosened, the scale of enterprises 
grew more massive, and the separation of ownership from 
corporate control became ever more apparent, the legitimacy of 
the new managerialism became the focus of intensifying political 
debate from the Progressive Era through the New Deal.  
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Proposals to federalize corporate law as a means of eliminating the 
“Delaware effect” and the resulting “race to the bottom” were 
debated repeatedly during the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, but 
could never overcome the resistance of state officials and 
constituencies, political conservatives, and managerial elites. This 
prolonged debate over the legitimacy of corporate capitalism and 
managerialism culminated with the New Deal, but still did not 
result in a federal corporation law. Instead, federal legislation and 
regulation was directed towards financial markets and their 
regulation that were more clearly national in scope and impact. 
The Securities Act of 1933 mandated disclosure standards for 
initial public offerings of stock on publicly traded markets.3 The 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 created a transparency and 
disclosure regime covering publicly traded stocks after their initial 
offering and designed primarily to ensure adequate information 
flowed to investors to strengthen and legitimate securities 
markets.4 The 1934 Act also laid the foundations of modern 
securities regulation by creating the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, enabling extensive agency rule making, and granting 
the SEC administrative enforcement powers. Yet the legacy of the 
old federalist structure remained. The post-New Deal corporate 
governance regime established a rough division of labor between 
securities law and state corporation law. The latter for the most 
part continued to govern the corporation’s internal structure and 
relationships.5  
                                            
3 15 U.S.C. § 77a-z. 
4 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-mm. 
5 For example, this division was made explicit in the DC Circuit’s decision in 
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990), in which the court 
ruled that Securities and Exchange Act did not grant the SEC regulatory 
authority over the internal affairs of listed corporations and held that SEC rules 
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The New Deal legislation did encroach on one traditional subject 
of state corporation law. The Securities and Exchange Act 
federalized shareholder proxy voting as part of a broader regulation 
of corporate (or more realistically, management’s) 
communications with shareholders. This placed control over one 
of the most structurally sensitive of all corporate governance 
functions in the hands of federal regulators. However, federal 
legislation and SEC proxy regulations gave management de jure 
and de facto control over the proxy process and thus over the 
nomination and election of the board of directors. By effectively 
giving managers the power to choose their ostensible overseers, 
the federal regime entrenched managerial power and authority 
within the corporation.  
The federal regime contained a number of other structural 
approaches to securities and corporate governance regulation. The 
Investment Company Act of 19406 encroached on traditional state 
law governing the composition of boards and the qualifications of 
directors of investment funds. The 1940 Act employed a modest 
form of structural regulation by prohibiting investment 
companies, such as mutual funds, from having fewer than forty per 
cent of its board comprised of independent directors, or a majority 
of its board comprised of representatives of a single bank.7 The 
failure of federal securities law and disclosure regulation to 
prevent corporate corruption and foreign bribery scandals during 
                                                                                                                
prohibiting dual class shares with unequal voting rights were beyond the scope 
of the agency’s delegated powers. 
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 through a-64. 
7 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10. However, “business development companies,” essentially 
publicly traded private equity firms that were exempted from some 
requirements of the Investment Company Act under a 1980 amendment, must 
have a majority of disinterested directors (those unaffiliated with the company’s 
sponsor and investment adviser). See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-55(a). The increase in the 
required number of independent directors from the original 1940 Act to the 
1980 amendments suggests the growing currency of board independence as an 
alternative form of regulation.  
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the 1970s resulted in yet another experiment in structural 
regulation. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 ostensibly 
required corporations to adopt internal controls and monitoring 
procedures to prevent corrupt business practices.8 Perhaps most 
importantly, the New York Stock Exchange listing rules, adopted 
in 1977 under pressure from the SEC, required that the boards of 
public companies form audit committees comprised entirely of 
independent directors. The listing rules are particularly important 
to the politics and regulation of corporate governance in that they 
have given the SEC a way to gain regulatory leverage over the 
internal governance of listed firms, otherwise denied it by judicial 
interpretations of the federal securities laws (See Chandler and 
Strine, 2002: n.12). 
Federal proxy voting rules and the Investment Company Act’s 
independent director provisions failed to appreciably reallocate 
power within publicly traded corporations and investment funds. 
Similarly, the FCPA’s internal control and monitoring 
requirements are widely viewed as ineffective and largely a 
failure.9 And the NYSE independent director and audit committee 
rules had minimal impact on the actual functioning of boards and 
corporate governance. These nascent forms of structural regulation 
maintained or replicated the managerialism that had already 
established itself as a defining characteristic of American corporate 
capitalism. Structural regulation as a check on managerial power 
was largely abandoned in favor of prescriptive formal regulation 
and market reinforcing disclosure rules. This followed an enduring 
pattern in which the disclosure requirements securities law and 
regulation largely eclipsed corporation law during most of the 
New Deal and post-war eras. Financial transparency secured by 
federal disclosure rules and substantial rates of litigation drove the 
                                            
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–3; 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(b)(2)-(6). 
9 See, e.g., U.S. Senate, 2003 (report detailing failure of federal enforcement 
officials to pursue IRS warnings of foreign corrupt practices by Enron). 
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American corporate governance system, rather than the structural 
or fiduciary features of state corporation law.10  
This eclipse of state corporation law came to a sudden and 
dramatic end in the ferocious battles over hostile takeovers during 
the 1980s. Although tender offers and hostile takeovers emerged 
during the 1960s and increased in incidence during the 1970s, the 
dramatic surge in their number and scale during the 1980s 
transformed the politics, law, and practice of corporate governance 
in the United States (Bratton, 1989). Suddenly, the composition 
and fiduciary duties of boards of directors became critically 
important as target corporations defended themselves against 
takeovers. Raiders and other takeover specialists carried the 
rhetorical and ideological banner of shareholder value and 
shareholder primacy in their legal and political struggle against 
managerial defences.11 The market for corporate control was 
heralded as the solution to corporate governance problems and as 
embodying the passing of American capitalism from the era of 
managerialism to one of shareholder capitalism.  
Facing the prospect of hostile takeovers, corporate managers met 
the limits of their tolerance for the market. Takeovers obviously 
threatened managerial security and prerogatives. Coming at the 
trough of American deindustrialization and in the wake of the 
severe recessions of the early 1980s, hostile takeovers also raised 
intense concerns over national economic decline and attendant 
social disruption that galvanized broad-based political opposition. 
Widespread suspicion of concentrated financial power, a crisis in 
the industrial economy during the 1980s, and the mobilization of 
politically powerful managers and local populist interest groups 
                                            
10 See also Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 
(1977) (primary concern of the Securities and Exchange Act is disclosure, while 
the substantive fairness of transactions is "at most a tangential concern of the 
statute"). 
11 For the relationship between the contractual theory of the firm, shareholder 
interests, and the rise of hostile takeovers, see id.: 1518-25. 
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generated a potent policy backlash (Roe, 1993). Court decisions 
significantly weakened fiduciary duties by sanctioning a plethora 
of takeover defences. Many states, with the important exception of 
Delaware, adopted harsh anti-takeover statutes. By the early-
1990s, hostile takeovers were few and far between, replaced by 
friendly merger and acquisition deals that typically included 
substantial benefits for incumbent managers and directors. The 
backlash against takeovers set the stage for the politicization of 
the law and practice of American corporate governance. As the 
market for corporate control reached its political limits, attention 
turned to other mechanisms of corporate governance to balance 
and adjust the interests of corporate stakeholders. Managers, 
institutional investors, shareholder groups, financial institutions, 
financiers, and unions sought to enshrine their policy preferences 
in the statutory law, regulation, legal doctrine, and “best 
practices” of corporate governance. Yet the politics of corporate 
governance and securities law during the 1990s revealed interest 
group conflict and policy confusion that precluded substantial 
reform.  
B. THE SEC IN THE 1990S: BIPOLAR ACTIVISM WITHIN 
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS 
The conservative ascendancy and the takeover wave of the 1980s 
heightened political conflict over corporate governance reform. As 
a result, during the 1990s, the SEC was whipsawed between 
managerial and pro-shareholder groups, along with their respective 
political allies. In the political battles that ensued, the SEC got 
little effective political support from shareholders. For one thing, 
diffuse and fragmented shareholders face insurmountable 
collective action problems that make unified and coherent action 
in opposition to managers a near impossibility.12 These same 
                                            
12 This fact reflects the core insight of Berle and Means’ classic 1932 work on the 
separation of corporate ownership and control, which has informed much of the 
political and economic analysis of corporate governance ever since. (Berle and 
Means, 1932) 
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collective action problems are magnified in the much larger 
political arena and afflict the political strength and effectiveness of 
shareholders as a class and as an (potential) interest group. Second, 
the pro-shareholder forces were also split among themselves with 
respect to their preferred mode of corporate governance reform. 
One group favored expanded formal disclosure regulation, enforced 
by the SEC (and to a lesser extent private litigation). The other 
sought to encourage the monitoring of management and corporate 
governance activism by institutional investors. The peculiar 
vacillations of SEC policy during the 1990s reflected this political 
and ideological conflict. From 1992 to 2000, the SEC under Arthur 
Levitt, a Clinton appointee, and his Republican predecessor, 
Richard Breeden, initiated a series of reforms to protect 
shareholders by improving managerial accountability and financial 
transparency—with mixed political and practical success.  
In 1992, after several years of pressure from institutional investors, 
the SEC under Breeden reformed its proxy statement rules to 
encourage corporate governance activism among large 
institutional investors by eliminating the requirement to disclose 
communications among large shareholders, thereby making it 
easier (and cheaper) for them to communicate with each other and 
with management.13 The amendments unleashed the fiercest fight 
over SEC rule changes in the agency’s history up to that time.14 In 
contrast to the transparency and disclosure rules common in 
                                            
13 See 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, 48,283 (1992), Regulation of Communications Among 
Shareholders, Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 CFR Pts. 240 & 249, 
Release Nos. 34-31326; IC-19031; File No. S7-15-92 (October 22, 1992). See 
Minow, 1991: 149 (arguing that previous federal corporate governance reforms 
had been generally initiated internally by government agencies, but that 
institutional shareholders drove the 1992 proxy reforms); see also Frenchman, 
1993: nn. 2, 6 & 155-156 and accompanying text. 
14 Over 1,700 comment letters flooded into the SEC and business attacks on the 
proposal were even more heated than the statements in support. The rule 
inflamed economic conflicts and ideological debates over the merits and 
legitimacy of managerialism and the potential financial and governance power 
of institutional shareholders. See Cioffi, 2002: pp. 210-212. 
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American securities market regulation, the 1992 proxy rules 
reduced disclosure obligations and represent an experiment in 
structural regulation that altered intra-corporate power relations 
by design to achieve the policy goal of increased monitoring and 
governance activism by institutional investors. The 1992 proxy 
rule changes appear to have encouraged greater governance 
activism by institutional investors, but at the expense of 
transparency. Institutional investors, with some notable 
exceptions, preferred to voice their concerns and criticisms to 
management in private communications that would not depress 
the price of their stock holdings (See Zanglein, 1998). These 
discussions and their contents no longer had to be disclosed in 
proxy statements, at the risk of privileging large institutions over 
small investors in access to information. The use of structural 
regulation in this case exacerbated problems of transparency, 
opportunism, and insider trading.  
The SEC under Levitt pursued a more activist policy agenda 
favoring small shareholders, but was most spectacularly and 
soundly defeated in attempts to reform the accounting treatment 
of stock options and to curb conflicts of interest in the accounting 
industry in order to improve the accuracy of audits. Fearing that 
accounting firms acting simultaneously as consultants and 
auditors would compromise the integrity of their auditing in order 
to generate and keep lucrative consulting contracts, the SEC 
wanted to prohibit accounting firms from handling both auditing 
and consulting work for publicly traded corporations. Accounting 
firms enlisted allies in Congress to fight on their behalf and bring 
legislative pressure on the SEC, until the regulatory proposal was 
withdrawn.15 Likewise, the SEC under Levitt failed in its attempt 
                                            
15 The regulation of accounting firms and their conflicts of interest became an 
especially important issue following a 1994 Supreme Court decision that largely 
abolished “aiding and abetting” liability, under which accounting and law firms 
could be held liable for fraudulent statements and omissions by publicly traded 
corporate clients. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 
511 US 164 (1994). Without the threat of private litigation, SEC regulation was 
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to require the expensing of stock options in corporate financial 
statements managers growing rich on huge grants of stock options 
and “New Economy” technology firms dependent on options as a 
form of compensation enlisted bipartisan congressional and 
executive branch support to quash the initiative.  
However, the Levitt SEC was successful in pushing through a new 
regulation that ended the practice of selective disclosure of 
important business and financial information to favored analysts 
and institutional investors. In response to the proposed reform, the 
SEC received over 6,000 comment letters eclipsing the former 
record set by the 1992 proxy reforms (SEC, 2000: § II A (1), 
especially n. 9). One indication of the intensifying public salience 
and conflict over corporate governance issues In August 2000, the 
SEC shifted direction with the adoption of Regulation “Fair 
Disclosure” (“Regulation FD”) (SEC, 2000). Regulation FD 
prohibited selective disclosure of material information by 
corporate managers to favored analysts, financial institutions, and 
institutional investors if that information is not released to the 
general public. The SEC promoted formal equality among 
shareholders by addressing the problem of informational 
asymmetries that disadvantage small investors vis-à-vis large 
institutions. Further, Regulation FD expressly rejected private 
litigation by shareholders and relied exclusively on SEC 
enforcement.  
The 1992 proxy reforms and Regulation FD reflect a fundamental 
tension and confusion in SEC policymaking. They are at cross-
purposes. Regulation FD undermined the SEC’s own 1992 proxy 
reforms by limiting the ability of institutional investors to pursue 
corporate governance activism through private communications 
with managers and board members. The logic of monitoring by 
institutional investors tends to conflict with the logic of equal 
                                                                                                                
the only enforcement option remaining. Tort reform legislation in 1995 (see 
Part III. A, below) authorized aiding and abetting suits brought by the SEC, but 
not by private plaintiffs. 
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access to information for all shareholders. More fundamentally, 
the mechanisms of structural regulation may often conflict with 
established forms of disclosure regulation. The tensions in SEC 
policy and approaches to regulation were exacerbated by political 
struggle between Republicans and Democrats over the regulation 
of business and the growth of the regulatory state. An alliance 
between political conservatives and managerialist interests sought 
to curtail litigation and expand managerial prerogatives through 
litigation reform. A more nebulous opposition alliance between 
the political center-left, organized labor, and a number of 
institutional investors and shareholder groups sought increasingly 
stringent regulation to protect investors from fraud and 
opportunism by financial and managerial elites. Contradictory 
regulatory policies and rules embodied this conflict. The 1992 
proxy rule amendments presumed that more intensive 
communications between institutional investors and managers 
would benefit all shareholders. Regulation FD presumed that such 
communications fostered unfairness and insider trading. By the 
end of 2000, these two dominant paradigms of corporate 
governance regulation and reform had collided on the levels of 
politics, law, and corporate practice.  
III. THE POLITICS OF SECURITIES LITIGATION 
REFORM IN THE 1990S 
A. NEO-LIBERALISM AND STRUCTURAL EXPERIMENTATION: 
THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 
Litigation has played a uniquely prominent role in American 
securities regulation and corporate governance. Securities fraud 
suits have long served as a major, if controversial, mechanism for 
defining and enforcing shareholder rights in the United States. 
Criticism of securities litigation began to intensify during the 
merger and acquisition boom of the 1980s and the subsequent 
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recession and bankruptcies of the early 1990s.16 Securities 
litigation had steadily increased from the 1970s to the 1990s.17 
Firms were sued with greater frequency—often in response to 
inevitable market fluctuations in the price of securities. In part, 
the rise in litigation rates was due to the development of a 
sophisticated plaintiff-side securities litigation bar that produced a 
veritable litigation industry and provided substantial financial 
backing to the Democratic Party. But the increase in litigation also 
reflected the growing stakes and contentiousness of inter-
corporate battles, the expansion of securities fraud law into new 
areas, and the increased use of sophisticated and often 
manipulative financial practices. The rise in securities litigation 
rates expanded the size of the anti-litigation coalition and the 
intensity of its opposition to liberal securities laws and legal 
doctrines. In addition to corporate managers, the traditional foes of 
securities litigation, securities litigation reform legislation was 
supported by of securities firms and accounting firms, along with 
the economically ascendant Silicon Valley firms that depended 
upon equity financing. (Avery, 1996: 339-54; Kelleher, 1998: 51-53)  
By the early 1990s, these critics found both political parties 
increasingly congenial to their pleas for legislative relief from 
lawsuits. As part of a more business-friendly political strategy and 
policy agenda, the Democrats had sought to neutralize the issue by 
drafting more moderate reform legislation in 1993 and 1994 that 
balanced the interests of corporations, shareholders, and plaintiffs’ 
attorneys.18 Driven by interest group loyalties, political 
calculation, and an increasingly hard-line ideological approach to 
                                            
16 For an overview of the debate see Alexander, 1991; Seligman, 1996; for the 
influence the debate over the incidence and excesses of securities litigation on 
the drafting and passage of the PSLRA, see generally Avery, 1996. 
17 The rate and significance of the increase in securities litigation has been, and 
continues to be, hotly debated. See Alexander, 1991; Seligman, 1996; see also 
United States Senate, 1993. 
18 See Seligman, 1996: pp. 717-719; 140 Cong. Rec. S3685, S3696-3707 (daily ed., 
Mar. 24, 1994) (statement of Senator Dodd, co-sponsor of S. 1976). 
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policy, the Republican Party pushed for more substantial legal 
change. In 1993 the Republicans included securities litigation 
reform a component with their “Contract with America” 
campaign platform. After the 1994 “Republican Revolution,” in 
which the right wing of the Republican Party took control of the 
Congress under the leadership of Newt Gingrich, the party made 
good on their promise.  
The new Republican majorities in both houses of Congress shifted 
the terms of the securities litigation reform debate to the right and 
set to work drafting their own legislation. After three years of 
fierce political conflict and an epochal shift in the control of 
Congress, conservative congressional Republicans spearheaded the 
passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(the PSLRA) over President Clinton’s veto.19 Intended to curtail the 
use of the courts and litigation for the prosecution of securities 
fraud claims, the PSLRA placed more stringent pleading 
requirements on securities fraud suits in an attempt to streamline 
the procedure for dismissing these suits before they entered the 
expensive discovery phase (Securities Regulation & Law Reporter 
(BNA), 1995). Its proponents hoped that the law would reduce the 
settlement value of, and thus the incentive to file, weak or 
meritless suits. President Clinton voiced general support for 
securities litigation reform in the securities area, as did many 
Democrats in Congress. However, he vetoed the legislation on the 
grounds that it imposed an excessively stringent standard for 
pleading securities fraud claims.20 The PSLRA became law as 
                                            
19 PSLRA, Public Law: 104-67 (December 22, 1995), amending Title I of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq., Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995). For the Congressional veto override, see 141 Cong. Rec. S19,180 (daily 
ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (Senate); 141 Cong Rec. H15,223-24 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) 
(House of Representatives). For the text of President Clinton's veto message, see 
141 Cong. Rec. H15,214-15 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995). For background and 
practical analysis of the PSLRA, see Clark, 1997: 386-388; Seligman, 1996. 
20 Clinton, 1995; see Lewis, 1995. Clinton’s veto message objected that "the 
pleading requirements of the Conference Report with regard to a defendant's 
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Congress overrode Clinton’s veto by a vote of 319 to 100 in the 
House and 68 to 30 in the Senate. The success of the veto 
override—the only time Congress overrode a veto by President 
Clinton during his two terms in office—reflected a sea change in 
American politics and policy characterized by the hardening of 
Republican opposition to private litigation, eroding support of 
Democrats for private litigation as an enforcement mechanism, 
and the growing political influence of corporate managers. The 
political center gravity in Congress shifted decisively against 
private litigation as a favored mechanism of policy enforcement.  
The PSLRA also reflected the struggle to find alternative 
enforcement mechanisms to replace private litigation. By the 
1990s, policy makers were faced with a dilemma. Business and 
professional interests had mobilized to form a powerful coalition 
against securities lawsuits. Yet, lawsuits were a central 
enforcement mechanism in the American securities law and 
corporate governance machinery. The PSLRA embodies three of 
the alternatives: (1) the use of institutional investors to monitor 
plaintiffs’ attorneys on behalf of all shareholders; (2) reliance on 
certified public accountants as informational intermediaries and 
monitors of corporate finances, management and boards of 
directors; and (3) litigation by the SEC rather than private 
plaintiffs and attorneys. The first of these alternatives, and to 
more limited extent the second, represented a nascent structural 
turn in securities and corporate governance law. Rather than 
prescriptive rules backed by the threat of litigation, private actors 
would perform governance and enforcement functions in a largely 
autonomous fashion through the deliberate design of institutional 
relationships and incentives under law. Not only would expensive 
and inefficient litigation be reduced, in some respects the 
autonomy of the private sphere would be preserved and even 
reinforced.  
                                                                                                                
state of mind impose an unacceptable procedural hurdle to meritorious claims 
being heard in Federal courts."  
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The growing importance of institutional investors was evident in 
the design of securities law enforcement mechanisms as 
reconfigured by the PSLRA. The 1995 legislation created the 
position of “lead plaintiff,” generally the shareholder with the 
largest stake in the relief sought, that was expected to curb alleged 
excesses in shareholder litigation.21 The provision gives the lead 
plaintiff greater power to police shareholder securities litigation, 
promote the swift disposition of meritless suits, and prevent 
collusive settlements. The provision recognized the size and 
corporate governance potential of institutional investors by legally 
empowering them as an institutional counterweight to both 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and to managerial power. Congress wishfully 
saw institutional investors as a means of resolving the 
enforcement problem. Institutional investors were cast 
collectively as less disruptive, adversarial, and litigious agents of 
market regulation. This image of self-regulation by rival capitalists 
appealed to policy makers and managerial interests alike.  
The interposition of institutional investors between the plaintiffs’ 
bar and defendant corporations produced unintended and 
paradoxical results. (Securities and Exchange Commission, 1997) 
Institutional investors initially had little interest in intervening to 
terminate lawsuits and incur a possible breach of fiduciary duty 
suit from other, smaller shareholders (Grundfest and Perino, 1997). 
The expense and unpredictability of litigation and the fear of 
potential liability to other shareholders displeased with their 
conduct as lead plaintiff discouraged deep-pocketed institutional 
investors from curbing securities litigation.22 Instead, they used 
this new power to intervene with growing frequency in securities 
                                            
21 PSLRA, § 27(a)(3)(A) & (B), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(A) & (B); 78u-4(a)(3) (A) & 
(B) (procedure and substantive criteria for appointment of “lead plaintiff”). This 
provision was inspired by an inventive law review article by Weiss and 
Beckerman (1995). 
22 However, the more stringent standards the PSLRA imposed on the civil 
procedure rules for pleading scienter did empower courts to curb securities 
litigation. See, e.g., Sale, 1998; Johnson, 1997.   
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litigation to prevent plaintiffs’ counsel from cutting opportunistic 
collusive settlement deals with managers in meritorious cases, 
thereby prolonging litigation and increasing the amount of final 
settlements and damage awards (Johnson, 1997). Thus, the Act 
simultaneously reformed securities litigation and increased the 
power of the funds—but not in the way its sponsors anticipated.  
The PSLRA’s use of auditors to detect fraud and the SEC civil 
actions enforce the securities laws proved far less effective. As is 
abundantly clear in hindsight, Title 3 of the PSLRA, which 
contains the auditing and auditor disclosure provisions, failed to 
address the basic conflicts of interest in the management-auditor 
relationship and did not provide a functional structural alternative 
to litigation as an enforcement mechanism. Instead, during the 
late 1990s, auditing firms became—knowingly or unknowingly—
instrumental in the manipulation or outright misrepresentation of 
corporate finances. The relatively hands-off regulatory approach to 
the accounting industry failed to empower or compel it to play the 
structural monitoring role purportedly sketched out for it by 
Congress in the PSLRA. In part, the failure of Title 3 to improve 
the quality of audits was due to the politics of litigation reform. 
Auditor responsibilities under the PSLRA were enforceable by the 
SEC alone, not by private litigation, and only when auditors filed a 
report of suspected illegal activity. The Act was insufficient to 
alleviate the conflicts of interest entrenched within the accounting 
industry and auditor-client relationships.  
More generally, SEC civil and criminal actions authorized under 
the PSLRA23 failed to fill the enforcement gap left by securities 
litigation reform. At precisely the time when the law placed 
greater responsibility on the Commission to pursue enforcement, 
the stock market boom of the late 1990s sent agency’s workload 
spiraling upwards and the SEC’s budget lagged far behind the 
                                            
23 See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(f) (authorizing SEC actions for “aiding and abetting 
liability), 15 USC 78j–1(d) (SEC has exclusive authority to enforce auditor’s 
duty to disclose fraud and penalize violations). 
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demands placed upon it. The agency’s turnover and depletion of 
skilled personnel soared during the 1990s and early 2000s as the 
SEC’s budget condition and staffing deteriorated relative to the 
increasing demands on its resources. Only after the surge of 
destructive corporate finance scandals following the collapse of 
Enron in 2001 did Congress take action to substantially increase 
the SEC’s budget and authorize the hiring of enforcement 
personnel. The PSLRA’s experiments with structural regulation 
failed. But the law and subsequent legislation revealed a clear and 
potent political realignment antagonistic to securities litigation. 
The political constraints that precluded the adoption of litigation-
driven enforcement mechanisms in securities regulation and 
corporate governance law would even withstand the post-Enron 
corporate governance crisis. 
B. NEO-LIBERALISM THROUGH CENTRALIZATION: THE 
SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT OF 1998 
The failure of the PSLRA to effectively stem the flow of securities 
fraud suits drove the Act’s proponents to redouble their efforts. 
The federal character of the United States and its fragmented legal 
and regulatory systems further impaired the effectiveness of the 
federal securities litigation reforms. Although the number of 
securities fraud lawsuits dismissed by federal courts rose sharply 
from 13 to 30 per cent between 1995 and 2000, critics of litigation 
asserted that the number filed in state courts had risen and would 
continued to rise sharply (See Loomis, 2000; Caiola, 2000: nn. 183-
190 and accompanying text ). These suits were brought under 
federal securities laws (over which the state courts had concurrent 
jurisdiction) and under the states’ “blue sky” laws. These state 
laws formed a parallel securities law regime available to plaintiffs’ 
attorneys as access to the federal courts was curtailed. 
Congressional securities litigation reformers sought to close this 
avenue, arguing that it circumvented the PSLRA and invited a 
splintering of the legal standards governing publicly traded 
corporations. However, to do so by preempting state laws, the 
Republican right in Congress would have to directly repudiate 
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their professed commitment to federalism and the devolution of 
political and regulatory power.  
Spurred on by arguments—and at best ambiguous evidence24—that 
the PSLRA had pushed securities litigation into state courts, 
Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
of 1998 (SLUSA) to close the alleged loophole.25 The SLUSA was a 
second sweeping securities litigation securities litigation reform 
bill that preempted the securities fraud provisions of state blue-
sky laws and granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over 
securities lawsuits brought under federal law.26 This time the 
Republicans had additional Democratic support, especially from 
the California delegation that had become increasingly concerned 
over securities suits against Silicon Valley corporations dependent 
upon securities markets for raising capital.27 The bill passed in the 
Senate by 79-21, carrying a majority of Democrats (26 to 19) and 
only two Republicans voting against the measure, and in the 
House by 319 to 82. Not a single Republican voted against the bill 
                                            
24See Caiola, 2000: nn. 186-190 and accompanying text. 
25 SLUSA, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as interspersed 
subsections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78). For analyses of the legislative history and 
political ramifications of the SLUSA, see Thompson, 1999; Pritchard, 2000; 
Caiola, 2000. 
26 Two years earlier, Congress had enacted another—more modest—preemption 
statute that conferred exclusive federal jurisdiction over the regulation of 
securities registrations (i.e., the initial marketing and sale of publicly traded 
stock). See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-290, 110 Stat. 3416; see especially 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r (West Supp. 1999). The 
NSMIA conferred exclusive federal court jurisdiction over the primary subject 
matter of the Securities Act of 1933. The SEC and Clinton administration 
successfully fought off a Republican attempt to enact a far more radical 
preemption of state securities regulation. See Seligman, 2003: pp. 674-681. The 
SLUSA extended preemption to the primary subject matter of the much broader 
and more important Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.  
27 See id. n. 190 (citing S. Rep. No. 105-182, at 4-5 (1998) (written testimony of 
Commissioner of the California Department of Corporations that without 
federal preemption and uniform rules the state with the most lenient securities 
fraud law will govern in a national marketplace). 
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in the House, while a majority of Democrats voted for it, 106 to 
80. They also won the support of moderate Democrats in Congress 
who were eager to cultivate high-tech industry support. Chastened 
by the PSLRA veto override and acutely sensitive to the political 
trends supporting litigation reform, the Clinton Administration 
also signed on in support of the legislation (Clinton, 1998).  
The SLUSA centralized regulatory authority over securities 
markets in striking fashion. The political potency of the shift away 
from litigious enforcement mechanisms and the growing political 
power of anti-litigation constituencies overrode the sentiments 
and rhetoric of conservative neo-federalism. Despite the title 
emphasizing “uniform standards,” the main goal of the law was to 
reduce litigation, not to create clearer or more coherent legal 
doctrine. Though the centralizing effect of the PSLRA and SLUSA 
collided with the entrenched structures of federalism in corporate 
governance law, they preserved the overlap of state corporate law 
with federal securities regulation. The SLUSA contained 
provisions, called the “Delaware carve outs,” that explicitly 
protected state fiduciary law and related derivative suits from 
preemption. Federal securities litigation reform thus generated 
opposing policy incentives: further fragmentation of corporate 
governance law by inducing increased reliance on state corporate 
law versus an even more radical intrusion of federal law into the 
traditional core areas of state corporation law. It was in this 
context of tension within and among policy approaches, and 
conflict between political parties and coalitions that the great 
1990s stock market bubble burst to reveal the shady practices, 
mass delusion, and outright fraud that the economic boom had 
concealed. The resulting legitimacy crisis would facilitate 
corporate governance reform and disrupt established patterns of 
regulation and federalism.  
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IV. THE SARBANES-OXLEY REFORMS: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE REFORM AND CONSTRAINED 
AUTONOMY IN POLICYMAKING  
A. THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF FINANCE CAPITALISM AND 
THE POLITICS OF REFORM 
The politics of corporate governance reform in the United States 
was driven by overwhelming external forces and events that, 
paradoxically, endowed policymakers with a rare and short-lived 
period of relative autonomy from established interest group 
politics. The most severe legitimacy crisis of the American 
financial and corporate governance systems since the Great 
Depression inflamed political support for more wide-ranging 
reform of the American corporate governance regime and 
disrupted the grip of a conservative coalition that favored minimal 
regulation and had blocked pro-shareholder reforms during the 
1990s. Yet public support for reform remained unfocused and 
detached from any specific concrete proposal, program, or policy 
agenda. These conditions loosened the constraints of interest 
group politics while increasing the autonomy of policymakers in 
fashioning a response to the crisis. That response became the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  
The corporate governance crisis revealed the necessity of strong 
legal rules and regulatory institutions as the foundation of 
functional, efficient private economic institutions—including both 
markets and the non-market of the corporate firm (Vogel, 1996; 
Cioffi, 2004b). Significantly, however, the law and the regulation it 
enabled did not loosen legislative restrictions on securities 
litigation, let alone create new causes of action. Instead, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act relied on a combination of governmental 
enforcement and structural regulation to carry out its reforms. 
Political dynamics and constraints drove the legislation in these 
directions.  
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Senate Democrats pushed through the most comprehensive 
corporate governance reform in the United States since the 1930s. 
This outcome can only be understood in the context of an 
unusual—and temporary—interregnum of interest group politics. 
The extraordinary scope, severity, and duration of these financial 
scandals undermined the legitimacy of managerial and 
professional elites and their political allies who opposed reform 
and allowed the Democratic leadership in the Senate, where the 
party held a short-lived majority prior to the 2002 midterm 
elections, to seize the policy agenda of substantial corporate 
governance reform. Under these conditions, they outflanked and 
overrode the resistance to pro-shareholder reforms mounted by 
congressional Republicans, the Bush Administration, and powerful 
vested managerial and accounting industry interests. 
B. THE TWIN FEARS: FINANCIAL COLLAPSE AND POPULISM 
The euphoric dot.com bubble of the 1990s died a painful death, as 
bubbles always do.28 The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by 25 
percent between its March 19, 2000 peak and July 19, 2002. The 
Standard and Poor 500 index lost nearly 28 percent during the 
same period.29 The Wilshire 5000 Index, among the most 
comprehensive of American stock indexes, fell by over 40 per cent 
from its March 24, 2000 peak of $17.25 trillion to $10.03 trillion 
on July 18, 2001 (Feaster, 2002; Seligman, 2003: 624). The bursting 
of the stock market bubble and the sustained impact of corporate 
                                            
28 For a classic account of financial bubbles and crashes, see Kindleberger, 
1989/1978. For an extremely insightful and prescient study of the dot.com 
bubble of the 1990s published just before the American stock market crash, see 
Shiller, 2000. 
29 See Graham, Litan, and Sukhtankar 2002: 3. A further breakdown of these 
losses indicates the importance of the disclosure of the WorldCom fraud. Fully 
14% of the aggregate 25% DJIA loss occurred after the WorldCom disclosure on 
June 24th. The S&P lost 15% of its 28% total loss from the date of the 
disclosure. Id. 
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scandals and bankruptcies from the collapse of Enron in December 
2000 wiped out approximately seven trillion dollars of market 
capitalization. According to one estimate, 17 per cent of these 
losses were attributable to the wave of corporate finance scandals 
(Graham, Litan, and Sukhtankar 2002: 2).  
The crash not only destroyed investors’ portfolios, it also revealed 
the manipulative and often outright illegal financial conduct of 
corporate managers, accountants, financial institutions, and 
attorneys. The precipitous decline of the stock markets drained a 
swamp of misconduct that many suspected during the boom, but 
few were willing to directly or clearly acknowledge.30 The crash 
revealed the deterioration of the quality of accounting and 
financial disclosure—followed by a collapse of public confidence in 
the reliability of each. Joel Seligman notes that “[b]etween 1997 
and 2001 the number of earnings restatements grew each year 
from 116 in 1997, to 158 in 1998, 234 in 1999, 258 in 2000, and 
305 in 2001” (Seligman, 2003: 624). After the collapse of the 
markets, the prevalence and severity of the fraud, financial 
engineering, earnings management, creative accounting, and other 
dubious financial practices of the boom years came into focus.  
The mass shareholding that had developed in the United States 
during the 1980s and 1990s, once a key societal support for pro-
market policies, now fueled pervasive cynicism, resentment, and 
finally fury against business, financial, and political elites.31 
                                            
30 One hedge fund manager, who had correctly warned about Enron, commented 
about the accounting scandals, "For the most part, this stuff was hiding in plain 
sight[.]" (Berenson, 2002). Alan Greenspan had warned of “irrational 
exuberance” in the stock market years before the crash and many academic and 
financial commentators realized that the United States was in the midst of a 
stock market bubble during the late 1990s. See, e.g., Shiller, 2000. 
31 See, e.g., Gosselin and Flanigan, 2002; Norris, 2002; Financial Times, June 28 
2002; Petruno and Yamanouchi, 2002; Morgenson, 2002; Nagourney, 2002; 
Dunham, 2002.  
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Business and neo-liberal deregulation lost their luster in both 
ideological and political terms. The legitimacy of finance 
capitalism itself appeared to teeter as the prestige and reputations 
of principal political and economic actors plummeted. Investor 
confidence in the securities markets collapsed along with stock 
prices. Massive corporate finance scandals at Enron, Tyco, 
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia, and other major 
corporations, along with the enormous market losses, stoked 
popular resentment of corporate and financial elites. Revelations 
of managerial fraud, looting, and empire building punctured the 
inflated cult of the CEO. The abuses and improprieties of 
corporate managers also revealed the inadequacies of corporate 
boards of directors, auditors and other informational 
intermediaries, government regulation, and regulators. In the 
harsh light of hindsight, boards of directors of defrauded, looted, 
and bankrupt firms appeared at best negligent, and at worst 
corrupt.  
Key informational intermediaries, most importantly accountants 
and stock analysts, failed to protect the public interest and 
appeared mired in and hobbled by conflicts of interest. If Enron 
symbolized the culture of corporate fraud and board failure during 
the 1990s, its auditor Arthur Anderson represented the spread of 
corruption to the self-regulating professionals entrusted to protect 
the public interest in transparency. Likewise, stock analysts were 
unveiled as shills for the investment banks that employed them, 
and their stock ratings exposed as largely worthless and often 
deceptive. From Enron’s collapsed in autumn 2001 through mid-
2002, an increasing percentage of the electorate began to view the 
entire financial system as built on insider conflicts, fraud, and 
manipulation—just as it unraveled in public.  
Government did not escape the corrosive skepticism of the 
souring public mood. Securities regulators and prosecutors had 
failed to deter, detect, or punish managerial misfeasance and 
malfeasance. Congress was also vulnerable to charges that it had 
passed litigation reform legislation that intensified the pressures 
on the SEC while failing to provide the funding necessary for it to 
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function. The SEC itself was chaired by Harvey Pitt, a prominent 
securities lawyer known for his representation of accounting firms 
in private practice and an avowed skeptic of regulation. During the 
1990s, congressional opposition in both parties had also rolled 
back a proposal by FASB to require expensing of stock options and 
an effort by the SEC to compel the separation of auditing and 
consulting services by accounting firms. Boards turned out not to 
be watching the CEOs, and no one was watching the watchers. 
Corporate managers, directors, professionals, and government all 
fell in the public’s esteem.  
By the spring of 2002, some political and economic leaders began 
to fear that the American financial system as a whole might 
collapse. The wave of corporate finance scandals and bankruptcies 
frayed public confidence in the soundness, stability, and 
fundamental integrity of the financial and corporate governance 
systems.32 Increasingly, the public perceived that the scandals 
reflected fundamental corruption and dysfunction at the core of 
the American corporate governance and political systems 
(Graham, Litan, and Sukhtankar, 2002: 2). By late June, worries of 
an international financial contagion increased as American, 
British, French, and German stock markets each suffered double-
digit losses in the first half of 2002.  
“Investor confidence” became a de facto metric of political 
economic legitimacy in the context of the post-Enron corporate 
governance crisis. Perhaps for the first time in American history, 
the interests and perceptions of the investor class were viewed as 
                                            
32 Enron collapsed just after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, and 
that the succession of post-crash scandals unfolded in the aftermath of that 
catastrophe. The combination of the terrorist attacks and pervasive financial 
scandals led policymakers in and out of Congress to fear the possibility of a 
general collapse of the American and international financial systems. This 
perception was repeatedly stated in interviews with congressional aides from 
both parties. 
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largely coterminous with those of the electorate at large.33 The 
scandals and their increasing toll on the financial markets raised 
the specter of a backlash against malfeasance and misfeasance 
among corporate managers, directors, and the financial elite. 
Populist backlash against financial elites is a recurrent theme in 
American political and legal history. However, past episodes of 
backlash in response to scandal and financial crisis had been 
driven, or at least colored, by anti-financier populism.34  
Yet, the post-Enron politics of reform was not so much anti-
management or anti-financier as it was pro-shareholder. This 
reflects a substantial shift in the politics of corporate and financial 
regulation in the United States. Integrity and fairness of the 
markets, the adequacy of financial disclosure, and conflicts of 
interest in corporate governance were increasingly judged by the 
criteria of shareholder interests, rather than those of consumers, 
local communities, workers, unions, or small business. The post-
Enron corporate governance crisis made clear that the legal rules, 
market and corporate structures, and regulatory enforcement that 
buttress shareholder interests and investor confidence had become 
crucial to the legitimacy of the political economic order. A 
striking fact about the American corporate governance crisis of the 
early 2000s is that corporate governance reform was designed to 
restore and reinforce the structural features of the American 
                                            
33 This is not to argue that shareholder interests actually are indistinguishable 
from those of the rest of the electorate. See, e.g., The Economist, October 19, 
2000 (discussing the rise of an American “shareholder class” and Zogby data 
indicating the distinctive interests and policy preferences of its members). 
34 The work of Mark Roe (e.g., 1991, 1993, 1994), for example, details the myriad 
restrictions placed on American financial institutions to fragment stock 
ownership, markets, and lines of business. These measures were intended to 
benefit shareholders, but they were driven by hostility to financial interests and 
a desire to deliberately weaken them. In contrast, recent corporate governance 
reforms do not seek to subordinate or disadvantage financial institutions. See 
also Moran, 1991 (scandal triggers financial system reform). 
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political economy as it had emerged from the 1980s, with its 
market-centered financial system, preoccupation with shareholder 
value, and financially driven corporate restructuring and 
strategies. From this perspective, corporate governance reform was 
not radical, but an essentially conservative response to crisis in a 
conservative era.  
C. THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF REFORM POLITICS 
Sarbanes-Oxley was the product of a political struggle between 
Democrats using financial scandals against the Republicans, and 
Republicans seeking to delay or dilute the legislation in keeping 
with their loyalty to corporate supporters and their anti-regulation 
ideological policy agenda. The Democrats relied on public outrage 
over the scale and scope of the financial scandals of the late-1990s 
and its disruptive effect on interest group power.35 Given the 
Republican Party’s control of the Presidency and House of 
Representatives, and its greater unity and discipline within the 
veto-prone structure of the federal government, substantial reform 
was only possible under crisis conditions that weakened interest 
group influence and made resistance to reform intensely 
unpopular. Corporate governance reform in the United States was 
as much a product of historical contingency as of underlying 
structural changes in the economy. 
Opponents of reform among interest groups and in the Republican 
Party hoped to ride out the scandals without any major legislative 
or regulatory initiative. Sensing political vulnerability from the 
spreading scandals, the Bush administration announced a ten-point 
plan to combat corporate corruption in early March of 2002 
(Schlesinger and Schroeder, 2002). House Republicans led by 
Michael Oxley, Chairman of the House Finance Committee, 
                                            
35 See Cioffi, 2004b (forthcoming); Romano, 2004. For contemporaneous news 
articles discussing the Democrats’ exploitation of popular outrage over the 
scandals, see, e.g., Labaton and Clymer, 2002; Stevenson and Mitchell, 2002; 
Clymer, 2002; Stevenson and Oppel, 2002.  
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submitted a bill patterned after the Bush plan and began holding 
hearings on it in mid-March.36 The bill, known as the Corporate 
Accounting Reform and Transparency Act (CARTA), garnered 
little praise from commentators and the public and derision from 
congressional Democrats as an attempt to assuage the public with 
symbolic legislation. CARTA was especially vulnerable because it 
was supported by, and imposed relatively weak restrictions on, the 
accounting industry. The bill created a new accounting regulation 
body under the control of the SEC—then chaired by Harvey Pitt 
who was viewed by Democrats as too sympathetic to the 
accounting industry and major accounting firms. As the 
accounting scandals continued to spread, any connection with, or 
indication of sympathy with, the accounting industry became 
politically poisonous. Early on, the Republicans knew they were 
seen as close to business and financial interests and therefore 
politically vulnerable on issues of corporate corruption. They 
pressed forward with Oxley’s CARTA bill as a “marker” intended 
to frame the legislative debate over reform and establish the 
party’s bargaining position against the Democrats.37  
Shortly after the Republicans began work on CARTA, Senate 
Democrats, led by Banking Committee Chairman Paul Sarbanes, 
began holding hearings on the scandals and potential legislative 
responses to the crisis. Because they were completely shut out of 
the Republican-dominated House legislative process, the 
Democrats’ policy positions could only be channeled through the 
                                            
36 Though named for both Democratic Senator Paul Sarbanes and Republican 
Representative Michael Oxley, Sarbanes was the law’s chief architect and 
congressional proponent. Oxley only signed onto the Sarbanes’ bill once the 
White House chose to support passage of the Senate bill in order to control the 
political damage that the GOP was beginning to incur as the November 2002 
mid-term elections approached and the corporate scandals continued to spread. 
Interviews, Washington, DC, March 2003, March 2004.  Both Democratic and 
Republican interviewees recounted this version of events. See also VandeHei, 
2002 (Oxley criticizing the Sarbanes bill before conference committee). 
37 Interviews, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, and former 
congressional staffers, Washington, DC, March 2004.  
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Senate where they held a short-lived one-vote majority following 
Sen. James Jeffords’ defection from the Republican Party.38 Of the 
numerous committees that held hearings on Enron and the 
unfolding corporate governance crisis, however, the staid 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs took the lead 
on accounting and corporate governance reform. The committee 
had jurisdiction over the securities law and accounting issues that 
were seen as central to the crisis.39 The Banking Committee was 
the ideal place for a reform bill to originate if it was to have a 
chance of passage. It had a reputation for relative collegiality and 
technical sophistication.40 The technical focus of its members 
(with some exceptions) favored a more sober and deliberate 
legislative process less easily derailed by partisan rhetoric, 
posturing, and ideology.  
The populist backlash against the managerial and professional 
classes triggered by the massive post-bubble corporate financial 
scandals was conjured vividly in congressional hearings on the 
scandals and debates over responsive reforms. In the more 
ideologically-driven and rhetorically astringent House, 
Representatives sought to outdo one another in their 
denunciations of greed and corporate fraud and malfeasance. 
Democrats sought to seize the political mantle of reform and 
capitalize on the scandals by denouncing Republican neo-
                                            
38 This majority was precarious, and the public’s attention to and memory of 
financial scandals was short. Following losses in the November 2002 mid-term 
elections, both the Democrats’ control of the Senate and the public’s fixation on 
corporate finance scandals were gone.  
39 The Senate Judiciary, Commerce, Labor, Tax, and Investigations committees 
held hearings on issues raised by Enron and the crisis of corporate governance, 
but their jurisdictional competence was either too narrow or comparatively 
peripheral to frame a comprehensive policy response.  
40 Sarbanes, although on the left of the Democratic Party, commanded respect 
across the aisle as very smart, tough “workhorse” legislator, and was so 
described by interviewees inside and outside of government. Even many House 
Republicans held him in high regard. Interviews, U.S. House of Representatives, 
U.S. Senate, and former congressional staffers, Washington, DC, March 2004. 
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liberalism and systemic flaws in securities regulation and 
corporate governance. The Republicans set out to neutralize these 
attacks by adopting the rhetoric of shareholder value and 
confidence while framing the scandals as a matter of a few “bad 
apples” rather the product of structural flaws in regulation and 
corporate governance.  
The rhetoric of shareholder value filled the chambers of Congress. 
Rep. Michael Oxley, the Republican Chairman of the House 
Committee on Financial Services, introduced a hearing on 
Republican sponsored reform legislation by arguing that,  
“There should be no question that the Federal securities 
laws need to be updated to ensure that investors have 
access to transparent, and meaningful information 
concerning public companies. Enhancing the public’s 
faith in financial statements is absolutely critical. They 
serve as the bedrock of our capital markets” (U.S. House 
of Representatives, 2002a: 1).  
The ranking minority member on the Committee, Democratic 
Rep. John LaFalce of New York, made a similar point that 
legislative reform was necessary to “restore confidence in the 
integrity of our markets,” but also slipping in an attack on the 
PSLRA and SLUSA.41  
Similar language permeated the Senate debates over corporate 
governance reform. Senator Sarbanes opened the Senate hearings 
on reform legislation by positing, “It is commonplace, but 
nonetheless worth repeating, that our markets depend on 
investors’ confidence” (United States Senate, 2002, vol. 1, 
February 12, 2002: 2). He uttered a stark warning in the second 
hearing: “[T]here is, I think it is fair to say, a crisis of confidence” 
                                            
41 U.S. House of Representatives, 2002a: 3-4; see also U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2002b: 53-54 (Democratic critique of restrictions on securities 
litigation and liability). 
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(Id.: 97). A number of Democrats sharpened this general argument 
into a slashing attack on the Republicans’ largely neo-liberal 
domestic policy agenda, including litigation reform, which they 
presented as pro-management, anti-investor, and increasingly 
dangerous to economic stability.42 Republicans sought to 
neutralize the Democrats’ attacks and frame an alternative policy 
position by using the same language of trust and investor 
confidence. Michael Enzi, a Republican and the Senate’s only 
certified public accountant, echoed the sentiment, arguing that 
“the strength of our markets is only as strong as the underlying 
confidence in the listed companies” and acknowledging the role of 
government: “Congress and the SEC must find a middle ground… 
We must continue to convince investors, that at the core of the 
American capital markets, there must be a high level of integrity 
and ethics by all players” (United States Senate, 2002, vol. 3: 
1203). 
Legislative results accompanied this rhetoric of shareholder 
interests and investor confidence produced only because the 
corporate governance crisis had generated conditions that 
suspended interest group politics as usual. A striking and 
important feature of the reform politics of 2001-2002 was the 
disintegration of interest group influence and the predominance of 
entrepreneurial political actors in Congress.43 Tainted by scandal, 
corporate managers, accounting firms, and investment banks were 
weakened within the legislative process. Corporate managers 
remained peripheral to the legislative process as a result of their 
loss of prestige and influence in the wake of successive corporate 
scandals and the popular perception that they, as a class, had 
looted American corporations and stolen from their shareholders.  
                                            
42 See United States Senate, 2002, vol. 3: 1206-1213 (remarks of Sen. Reid), 1262-
1263 (remarks of Sen. Wellstone), 1291-1292 (remarks of Sen. Durbin). 
43 This analysis was originally developed in Cioffi, 2004b (forthcoming), see also 
Cioffi, 2004a. 
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Business interests were also deeply divided over reform. The 
financial services sector was divided in their interests and 
preferences concerning the proper extent of corporate governance 
reform and government regulation of business and markets. 
Financial institutions, such as investment banks, were split. They 
are dependent on public faith in the integrity of the securities 
markets, but are also privileged insiders that benefited from the 
status quo and stood to lose from reform. In addition to intra-
sectoral divisions, financial institutions and service providers were 
weakened in the political process by their alleged roles in 
numerous scandals—such as dishonesty and conflicts of interests 
in stock analysis, initial public offering and stock market 
manipulation, and the aiding and abetting dishonest of corporate 
executives. 
The institutional investor community remained split over 
legislative and regulatory reforms. Large public employee and 
union pension funds (such as CalPERS and TIAA-CREF) and 
institutional investor groups like the Council of Institutional 
Investors, long involved in a largely non-regulatory and voluntarist 
form of corporate governance activism, shifted their policy 
preferences dramatically in support of increased regulatory 
stringency and intervention in corporate governance. In contrast, 
corporate pension funds and most mutual funds—either controlled 
by or beholden to corporate managers—did not press for reform. 
The AFL-CIO and labor unions were strongly supportive of 
corporate governance reform. The reforms promised greater union 
influence in corporate governance through their close connection 
to union pension funds. Further, as representative organizations, 
unions and the pension funds they helped administer sought to 
protect their members’ reliance on private pension investments. 
Finally, the unions’ historical antagonism towards management 
(particularly where financial manipulation enriched bosses at the 
perceived expense of workers) fueled an enthusiasm for reforms 
that would curtail managerial power. But organized labor had little 
impact on the substance of the reforms, though its representatives 
were later instrumental in rounding up Democratic votes in 
Congress for the final passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley bill. The 
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influence of public pension funds and organized labor on the 
content of the reforms, like that of other interest groups, was 
minimal.  
The split in the business community (never as homogenous an 
interest group category as often implied) only widened as the 
corporate scandals deepened. A significant number of leading 
financial figures, including billionaire investor Warren Buffett, 
former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, and Goldman 
Sachs CEO Henry Paulson, publicly supported legislative and 
regulatory reform (Smith and Craig, 2002). Leading investment 
firms understood the depth and seriousness of the crisis, and they 
had an enormous stake in ensuring that it was contained—by 
regulatory reform if necessary. Likewise, the New York Stock 
Exchange also came out in support of reform—also in order to 
calm investors and restore confidence. The leading business 
lobbying groups, the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of 
Commerce divided over the proposed reforms. The Chamber of 
Commerce, historically more ideological in its intense opposition 
to government regulation, fought a rear guard battle against the 
reforms. The Business Roundtable, the preeminent lobbying group 
of corporate America, remained moderately opposed to reform. In 
the end, however, even the Roundtable, whose membership of 
predominantly large public corporations had long been opposed to 
government (including judicial) intervention into corporate 
governance, supported the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms. By late June 
2002, the Business Roundtable’s President, John J. Castellani, 
announced,  
"We've passed the critical mass, both from the 
standpoint of the political structure as well as the 
erosion of confidence of the capital markets in corporate 
America… It bodes for quicker and more intensive 
action" (Stevenson and Mitchell, 2002). 
The accounting industry, having much to answer for and fearing 
even more to lose from reform, fought strenuously against the 
legislation—even at the risk of further antagonizing public 
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opinion—but were in no position to stem the tide of popular 
opinion and political momentum. The large accounting firms, 
down to the Big Four after the indictment, collapse, and 
conviction (in that order) of Arthur Anderson, and the accounting 
industry’s trade association (the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants) were tainted by association with scandal, 
fraud, and conflicts of interest. Each of the Big Four was 
implicated in scandals. Collectively, the industry had lost its 
legitimacy as a profession. As the legislative process moved 
forward, some Republican staffers on Capitol Hill even told 
accounting industry lobbyists to stay away—their very presence 
was politically damaging.44 By July 2002 one accounting industry 
representative speaking to a senior congressional aide expressed 
the views of many in an industry and profession besieged by 
scandal, bad press, and a plummeting reputation: “Just make it 
stop.”45 
The discrediting of and division among economic elites and 
interest groups increased the autonomy of policymakers. This left 
the reformers in the Democratic Party remarkably unconstrained 
by interest group politics and free to capitalize on the public 
resentment of corporate managers and financial institutions in 
pushing the reform legislation. The drafting and passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act were driven by Senate Banking Committee 
Chairman Paul Sarbanes of Maryland. In contrast to the 
Republicans in both the House and Senate, Sarbanes and a 
majority of his fellow Democrats were favorably predisposed 
towards reform. The Democrats’ slim Senate majority gave 
Sarbanes the institutional power to frame and advance a specific 
and technical legislative agenda. The Democrats draped their 
concerns and proposals in the rhetoric of pro-shareholder fairness 
and regulatory reform that was overwhelmingly supported by 
public opinion. The Senate Banking Committee moved 
                                            
44 Interview, former senior Republican staff member, House Finance 
Committee, March 2004. 
45 Id. 
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deliberately through the winter, and more quickly during the late 
spring, and early summer of 2002, as the scandals and the sense of 
financial crisis among the public and the political economic elite 
escalated.  
By June 2002, the reform politics had taken on a life of its own 
beyond the control of interest groups and even Congressional party 
leaders. After cooling somewhat during the spring of 2002, the 
sense of panic and outrage spiraled upwards again as the corporate 
financial and accounting scandals culminated in late June with the 
multibillion-dollar collapse of WorldCom, following disclosure of 
a multi-billion dollar accounting fraud. The WorldCom collapse 
finally eroded Republican resistance to Democratic legislative 
reforms.46 Public demand for securities law and corporate 
governance reform had become irresistible. The Bush 
Administration and much of the Congressional Republican 
leadership sought to neutralize the scandals as a potent November 
2002 election issue by supporting corporate governance reform and 
accepting only minor compromises from the Democrats as the 
price (Associated Press, 2002; Oppel, 2002). One Republican staffer 
on Capitol Hill summed up the end game of the behind-the-scenes 
struggle over corporate governance reform: “Congress didn’t pass 
Sarbanes-Oxley, WorldCom did.”47  
                                            
46 The WorldCom fraud and bankruptcy decisively reinforced public perceptions 
of systemic corruption and stoked both fear and outrage. See, e.g., Waters, 2002; 
Chaffin and Bowe, 2002. For press accounts of the collapse of WorldCom see 
Noguchi and Merle, 2002; Feder, 2003 ($3.8 billion fraud originally disclosed 
later found to total between $9 and $11 billion). The WorldCom scandal focused 
public attention once more on the passivity and conflicts of corporate directors 
who enabled or at least failed to prevent managerial fraud and looting. See 
Norris, 2003. 
47 Interview, Washington, DC, March 2004. Interviewees inside and outside 
government unanimously agreed that the WorldCom collapse broke Republican 
resistance to the Sarbanes bill and made substantial corporate governance 
reform politically inevitable.  
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The question remains, why did the Democrats give up so potent a 
campaign issue by pushing through the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms? 
Some members of the Democratic Party leadership and organized 
labor would have preferred that Congress not passed a corporate 
governance reform bill in order to keep the issue of financial 
scandal alive for Democratic candidates in the 2002 mid-term 
elections. The Democratic leadership agreed to final passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act out of a combination of idealism and 
calculation. Sarbanes and a number of allies argued that reform 
could not be sacrificed for partisan political purposes given the 
danger the scandals posed to the national and international 
financial systems. In part, the Democrats chose to pursue good 
public policy over tactical expediency.48 They also needed to 
insulate themselves from charges of obstructionism, however. Had 
they derailed the reform legislation just prior to the election, the 
Democrats ran the risk of appearing to play politics with the 
American economy. Even at the height of the scandals, the 
Democrats received little credit from the public for their corporate 
reform efforts (Nagourney, 2002; Dunham, 2002). The corrosive 
effects of the corporate financial scandals on public confidence 
fostered an all-embracing public cynicism towards American 
economic and political institutions and elites that extended to 
both parties.49 Either party would have faced intense public 
hostility, and likely electoral losses if they appeared to have 
                                            
48 In interviews, Republicans as well as Democrats described the motivations for 
passing the act in these terms. Interviews, Washington, DC, March 2003, March 
2004.  
49 See, e.g., Gosselin and Flanigan, 2002 (discussing polls showing plummeting 
public confidence). Although the Democrats had a slight edge in polls asking 
which party could best reform business practices, the public’s undifferentiated 
outrage deprived them of the decisive advantage over the Republicans they had 
expected. As the corporate governance crisis reached its peak, a majority of poll 
respondents did not believe that legislative reforms would accomplish 
meaningful change. Id. 
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obstructed reforms or foiled the progress of the 
legislation(Stevenson and Mitchell, 2002).  
V. STRUCTURAL REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF 
CONSTRAINTS AND REGULATORY INNOVATION  
At the height of the corporate governance crisis, interest group 
politics loosened sufficiently to allow the Democrats to pursue 
substantial reforms, but two fundamental constraints of partisan 
politics remained more imposing. The first was the Republicans’ 
intransigence over adding or expanding any new shareholder rights 
enforceable through litigation. The second was that reforms giving 
shareholders a more direct and enhanced role in nominating and 
electing corporate directors were off-limits. Preservation of 
securities litigation reform was a non-negotiable item for 
congressional Republicans. It was a “line in the sand” over which 
they would have killed any reform legislation.50 Whereas the 
Democrats were at best ambivalent about securities litigation, the 
Republicans were almost universally intensely hostile to it. As a 
result, Sarbanes did not even raise the issue of private causes of 
action when drafting legislation. Sarbanes’ draft legislation never 
contained new private rights of action. Nor did the legislative 
debate present a serious effort, let alone a credible threat, of rolling 
back the 1990s’ legacy of restrictions on securities suits. The 
Republicans did not even have to fight to impose this constraint 
on corporate governance reform. Even so, Republicans in the 
House and Senate repeatedly expressed concern over any possible 
                                            
50 Interview, senior Treasury Department official, Washington, DC, March 2004. 
Sarbanes needed the support of Republican Senator Michael Enzi to report his 
bill out of committee, and the Democrats knew any attempt to expand the use 
or availability of private litigation was a “deal killer” for the Republicans. 
Interviews, Washington, DC, March 2003, March 2004. The one exception was 
an extension of the statute of limitations for securities fraud claims, which had 
been substantially shortened by the Supreme Court. This was a controversial 
issue, but one the Republicans could live with so long as the PSLRA’s 
restrictions remained intact. 
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increase in securities litigation as a result of corporate governance 
reform down to the final vote on Sarbanes-Oxley.51 
Driven by intense and rapidly shifting political pressures for 
reform, yet still constrained by the anti-litigation politics of the 
1990s, the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms were effectively forced to 
experiment with structural regulation.52 This followed not only 
from the political logic of the situation, but also from 
policymakers’ practical assessment of the unfolding corporate 
governance crisis in 2002. Sarbanes and many of the Democratic 
colleagues believed that this was a structural crisis, rooted in 
accounting and conflicts of interest, and they would have to 
fashion a structural solution to it.53  
Sarbanes-Oxley imposed a welter of new regulatory requirements 
and prohibitions on publicly traded corporations, directors, 
corporate managers, accountants, securities analysts, and 
attorneys. This discussion focuses on the most important and 
innovative provisions (Table 1, below).54 The most important of 
these legal changes wrought by Sarbanes-Oxley were the creation 
of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the PCAOB), 
and the reform of internal corporate board and management 
structures to institutionalize improved corporate governance 
within the firm. The PCAOB was a new private regulatory body, 
                                            
51 See, e.g., United States Senate, 2002, vol. 3: 1620-1621 (comments by Sen. 
Gramm). 
52 Board reform, independent director requirements, and more stringent auditor 
regulation, all later incorporated into the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, were not 
themselves new and had been debated at length for many years in academic and 
policy circles. However, but their enactment into law was a fundamentally new 
step in the politics and the legal framework of corporate governance.  
53 Interviews, Senate Banking Committee staff, Washington, DC, March 2004.  
54 One important regulatory change that does not neatly fit into the scheme of 
Table 1 and is left out is Sarbanes-Oxley’s mandatory separation of auditing and 
consulting services. Although this could be considered a form of structural 
regulation, it is more accurately described as enforced market segmentation to 
reduce conflicts of interest.  
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appointed by and under the oversight of the SEC, charged with 
regulating the accounting industry.55 The creation of the PCAOB 
federalized accounting regulation and displaced the self-regulatory 
character of the accounting profession and the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as the primary rule-making 
body in the fields of accounting and auditing.  







• Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), 
• Increase in SEC budget. 
Transparency & 
Disclosure Rules 
• Heightened disclosure of corporate finances, 
• Disclosure of “off-balance sheet” transactions,  
• Disclosure of codes of ethics (and waivers by the board),  
• Disclosure of reconciliation of “pro forma” financial 
results with generally accepted accounting principles (US 
GAAP), and  
• Real time disclosure of material financial information 
and developments, 
• CEO & CFO certification of accuracy of financial reports 




• Increased criminal and civil penalties on executives for 
disclosure violations, 
• SEC enforcement of 3rd party aiding & abetting liability, 
• Extension of securities fraud statute of limitations. 
Structural 
Regulation 
• Auditing committee comprised entirely of independent 
directors, Qualified financial expert must sit on audit 
committee, 
• Audit committee has direct responsibility for the 
appointment, compensation, and oversight of the outside 
auditors,  
• Audit committee must approve all auditor services, 
• Auditors must report directly to the audit committee,  
                                            
55 The creation of the PCAOB was consistent with congressional conservative’s 
preference for private institutions over governmental ones and enabled the new 
entity to recruit staff from the private sector more effectively by offering 
salaries far above the civil service scale. 
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• Compensation committees of independent directors set 
managerial pay, 
• Board given legal authority to hire it own counsel and 
consultants, 
• Limitations on non-audit services performed by the 
firm’s auditor (and board approval of permitted services), 
• Develop, implement, and certify adequacy of internal 
controls, 
• Whistleblower protections. 
 
The more innovative and path-breaking provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act are those using structural regulation to 
intervene in the internal structure and affairs of the corporation. 
Whereas the creation of the PCAOB extended traditional 
transparency and disclosure regulation to the accounting industry, 
the structural regulation provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley represent a 
substantial expansion of federal power in the corporate governance 
area. Although independent auditing committees have been 
required under New York Stock Exchange listing rules, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley board provisions are the first time that federal law 
and regulation directly intervened in the composition, structure, 
and operation of corporate boards.56 These issues had been within 
the traditional preserve of state corporation law and the nominally 
self-regulating stock exchanges. Public firms are now required to 
appoint an auditing committee comprised entirely of independent 
directors, and at least one member must be qualified as a financial 
expert under new SEC rules. The audit committee now has direct 
responsibility for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of 
the outside auditors. The auditors report directly to the audit 
                                            
56 Federal law had placed some rather minor restrictions on boards, such as the 
ban on interlocking directorates under the Clayton Antitrust Act, but nothing 
approaching those imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley. Likewise, New York Stock 
Exchange listing rules adopted under SEC pressure had already imposed board 
independence and committee requirements. However, Sarbanes-Oxley was the 
first time federal legislation directly addressed the subject and, in doing so, 
strengthened SEC authority and power. 
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committee, which must resolve any disputes between 
management and the auditors concerning financial reporting. It 
must also approve all auditor services. Likewise, the boards of 
public firms must now put in place independent compensation 
committees that set managerial pay. Sarbanes-Oxley also 
enhances the more general institutional capacities of the board by 
giving it the legal authority to hire independent counsel and 
consultants.  
Finally, the law requires CEOs and CFOs to certify that the firm’s 
accounts are accurate and in compliance with accounting rules. 
Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley also requires that CEOs certify the 
firm’s internal monitoring and risk management systems as 
adequate to prevent accounting manipulation and fraud. In 
practice, this provision compelled the thoroughgoing restructuring 
of intra-firm managerial, monitoring, and reporting structures and 
practices.57 Taken together, these provisions have imposed 
unprecedented federal regulatory control over the inner workings 
of the public corporation.  
By encroaching on the traditional subjects of state corporate law, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms centralized and federalized key 
aspects of corporate governance. This unprecedented federalization 
of corporate law represents departs from nearly two centuries of 
American federalism and left largely in place even at the zenith of 
the New Deal.58 This break with such a long-established allocation 
                                            
57 No provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has sparked more criticism than the 
Section 404 internal risk management certification provisions. Ironically, this 
provision has also been a boon to the accountants, who had to audit, assess, and 
sometimes consult on the design of risk management systems. The law that 
targeted the accounting industry has in at least one way enriched it 
significantly. 
58 Despite numerous critics who have asserted that Sarbanes-Oxley did not 
substantially alter the legal terrain of corporate governance (e.g., McDonnell, 
2003), others have emphasized the importance of this change in the scope and 
balance of federal authority. See, e.g., Karmel, 2004 (former SEC commissioner); 
Chandler and Strine (Delaware Chancellery Court judges). 
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of policymaking power indicates both the growing practical import 
and policy salience of corporate governance issues, along with the 
extraordinary political impact of the financial and governance 
scandals during 2001-2002 (Cioffi, forthcoming; Romano, 2004). 
Together, these regulatory reforms represent not only a potentially 
vast expansion of federal regulatory power, but also a substantial 
centralization of regulatory authority. Federal law and regulation 
have begun to displace traditions of federalism and the private 
managerial autonomy that had characterized much of American 
corporate governance. Sarbanes-Oxley thus represents both a 
stunning reversal of the anti-regulation agenda of the 1990s and a 
continuation of the skepticism towards private litigation as a 
mode of regulatory enforcement. The result was an innovative 
expansion of structural regulation.  
Members of Congress were aware of the innovative nature of the 
corporate governance reforms. They were also aware that the use 
of structural regulation afforded them a solution the problem of 
enforcement as well as the rapidly eroding legitimacy of American 
corporate governance institutions. As one congressional staffer 
described it, these structural fixes would be “self-executing” with 
no need (or option) for litigation.59 The operation of the 
institutional arrangement itself would be the enforcement. 
Congress was also cognizant of its deviation from well-worn 
customs of federalism that allocated corporate law to the states. 
Indeed, Oxley discussed the issue with his staff repeatedly.60 
However, even a majority of Republicans believed that the 
securities markets, and thus corporate governance framework that 
underpinned them, were pre-eminently national in scope and 
importance.61 Federalism was again jettisoned when it got in the 
way of practical politics.  
                                            
59 Interview, Washington, DC, March, 2004. 
60 Interviews, Washington, DC, March, 2004. 
61 Id. 
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The importance of structural regulation and board reform 
implicates the second powerful political constraint on the politics 
of corporate governance reform. Despite the significance and 
sweep of the reforms, Sarbanes-Oxley did not reform how 
directors are nominated and elected. The Act left the very 
foundation of corporate governance and managerial power under 
the control of managers. In a statute that relies to such a degree on 
structural regulation utilizing board independence, this is a 
striking omission. There are only intermittent references to the 
subject in the legislative record. Surprisingly, given its importance, 
there were but a few passing witness statements on the subject.62 
Congressional Democrats were almost entirely silent on the 
matter.63 Representative John LaFalce, then the ranking 
Democratic member of the House Finance Committee and a fierce 
critic of managerial abuses, merely noted that Congress did not 
have address the issue because the SEC was empowered to adopt 
rules governing the nomination and election of directors.64 Yet 
during this period the Democrats were attacking the SEC under 
Chairman Pitt as ineffectual and resistant to substantial reform. 
The subject of board nominations and elections was simply too 
explosive to handle.65 Any attempt to reform board nomination 
and election rules would have mobilized the American managerial 
elite against the Democratic Party and shifted its support even 
more disproportionately towards the GOP. Because the 
Democratic Party has become increasingly reliant on the support 
of at least sections of the managerial class, this threat precluded a 
fundamental challenge to the institutional bases of its power. 
                                            
62 See United States Senate, 2002, vol. 2: pp. 1010-1011, 1026 (comments by 
Sarah Teslik, Executive Director, Council of Institutional Investors). 
63 Interviews with congressional staff confirm that the issue did not come up in 
internal committee or partisan debates over the reform legislation. Interviews, 
Washington, DC, March, 2004. 
64 U.S. House of Representatives, 2002a: p. 55 (comments by Rep. LaFalce). 
However, LaFalce’s bill, voted down by the House, did contain a provision 
requiring a nominating committee comprised entirely of independent directors. 
65 This assessment was confirmed by a former senior Republican congressional 
aid. Email communication, February 1, 2005.  
48 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 02 NO. 01 
 
 
Moreover, Sarbanes’ priority was to pass the best bill possible 
under the circumstances. Prior to the WorldCom scandal, it was 
not clear that Sarbanes would even get his bill out of committee, 
let alone passed by the full Senate, reconciled with the House bill, 
and signed by President Bush. If a litigation provision would have 
killed it, so too would a foundational reform of the corporate 
power structure.  
VI. THE BUSINESS BACKLASH: RETURN TO POLITICS 
AS USUAL? 
A. THE BACKLASH BEGINS 
Ultimately, the SEC, under the Chairmanship of Pitt’s successor, 
William Donaldson, advanced a rather weak proposal to reform 
corporate proxy voting on board nominations and elections in 
October 2003. This proposal triggered a backlash by business 
against Sarbanes-Oxley and the regulatory reforms that followed it 
that vindicated the Democrats’ reluctance to address the issue in 
the first place.66 This backlash and the election of November 2004 
would bring the post-Enron reform era to an effective end. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley reforms were the product of exceptional, and by 
definition temporary, circumstances that short-circuited interest 
group and institutional politics as usual. With the ebbing of the 
corporate governance crisis, the dynamics and interest group 
balances of “normal” politics was restored. (Cf. The Economist, 
July 15th 2004)  
The business backlash had been simmering almost since the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Three general factors 
                                            
66 Legal scholar Mark Roe (1998) has written about “backlash” politics against 
business caused by left-wing or populist mobilization against financial and 
corporate interests. But backlash can work in the other direction, especially in a 
political system, such as that of the United States, where business and financial 
elites wield so much power and influence. This was the case as business 
interests pushed back against corporate governance reform during 2003-2004. 
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contributed to the backlash: (1) the perceived burdens of the new 
law and regulations, (2) managers’ hostility to regulatory 
constraints on their autonomy, and (3) the balance of partisan 
politics at the national level.67 Less than four months after the 
passage of the Act, and days after the Republican gains in the 2002 
congressional elections, Robert R. Glauber, chairman of the self-
regulating National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), 
advocated delay in implementing new regulations as he spoke out 
against "unduly bureaucratic" solutions to securities analyst 
conflicts of interest on Wall Street and their “onerous” costs to 
securities industry (White, 2002). By Sarbanes-Oxley’s first 
anniversary, one year after the peak of the accounting scandals, a 
former head of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants fumed that Sarbanes-Oxley represented “the 
criminalization of [corporate] risk taking, which is the same as 
criminalizing capitalism.”68  
A growing number of business representatives and neo-liberal 
commentators had begun to voice what would become an 
increasingly familiar litany of complaints about reform:  
• High compliance costs, including increased audit fees and 
“directors and officers” (D&O) insurance premiums,  
• Reducing the number of qualified people willing to serve on 
boards,  
                                            
67 The focus of this essay is on federal politics. This neither denies nor 
denigrates the significant developments in reform and enforcement efforts at 
the state level. State attorneys general, led by New York State Attorney General 
Elliot Spitzer, have been increasingly active in these areas and repeatedly have 
been the first to uncover and remedy an increasingly wide variety of financial 
improprieties throughout corporate America—often to the acute embarrassment 
of federal regulators.  
68 Schroeder, 2003 (quoting Robert Elliott, a former KPMG partner and former 
head of AICPA). 
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• Discouraging domestic firms from going public and 
inducing public firms to go private, 
• Discouraging foreign firms from listing on American stock 
exchanges, 
• Slowing investment and growth.  
• Encouraging excessive risk aversion by management,  
With the exception of increased D&O insurance and auditing fees, 
empirical and anecdotal evidence did not support these criticisms. 
One leading corporate governance consultant ridiculed the 
complaints as a bunch of “urban myths,” and Treasury Secretary 
John Snow dismissed them out of hand.69 Even the increased 
auditing fees did not appear to be significant in the broader context 
of corporate cost structures.70 Even so, polls of corporate 
executives revealed growing managerial skepticism and outright 
hostility towards corporate governance reform and regulation 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003). 
By mid-2004, the business backlash against corporate governance 
reforms had gathered momentum (Johnson and Birnbaum, 2004). A 
proposed SEC reform of proxy rules to give shareholders the (very 
limited) ability to nominate and elect corporate directors 
mobilized and intensified a growing managerial backlash against 
corporate governance reform. The fight over board nominations 
and elections went to the very core of corporate governance and 
managerial power in the United States and triggered far fiercer and 
broader opposition. Because the logic of structural regulation 
under Sarbanes-Oxley depends on improving both the 
representational and monitoring function of boards, the proposed 
                                            
69 Id. (quoting Patrick McGurn of Institutional Shareholder Services). 
70 Id. 
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proxy rule amendments would supply a foundation for the 
Sarbanes-Oxley reforms that they heretofore lacked.  
Two other issues were particularly prominent in the increasingly 
vocal managerial hostility towards reform: (1) the expensing of 
stock options under newly proposed accounting rules, and (2) the 
difficulties and expense of complying with the internal control 
certification requirements of section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Neither triggered broad-based resistance to corporate governance 
reform. Opposition to the mandatory expensing of stock options 
was concentrated in the high-tech industry—most business 
interests had long concluded that this battle had been lost and that 
expensing would come, probably sooner rather than later (See, e.g., 
Norris, 2004; Spinner, 2003b). Nor are the section 404 internal 
monitoring requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley the stuff of an 
enduring anti-regulation backlash. Although the costs and burdens 
of section 404 compliance were and are not trivial, most managers 
of large publicly traded firms accepted them and many managers 
saw potential benefits of improved managerial capacity through 
better internal monitoring. The most politically powerful business 
interests were therefore not intensely opposed to section 404. 
Also, now that most of these internal control systems are in place, 
many of the costs and complaints generated by section 404 will 
likely diminish (Cf. Byrnes, 2004; Roberts, 2004a, 2004b; The 
Economist, 2004b). Managerial hostility to section 404 remains 
more pronounced among the managers of smaller public firms, but 
this does not explain the broader backlash against corporate 
governance reform. Significantly, neither the SEC nor Congress 
made any effort to roll back the internal monitoring or 
certification requirements of section 404. But the SEC’s 
shareholder voting reform proposal was something else entirely. 
B. BACKLASH VICTORIOUS: THE FAILURE OF THE SEC’S 
SHAREHOLDER VOTING REFORM 
Following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC under William 
Donaldson, Harvey Pitt’s successor as SEC Chairman, engaged in a 
historic run of rulemaking. The agency strengthened financial and 
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proxy vote disclosure, accounting rules, and stock exchange 
regulation. It extended structural regulation directly to mutual 
funds in response to a series of fund governance scandals by 
mandating board independence from fund advisors such as 
Fidelity, Putnam, and Vanguard by requiring a majority of 
independent directors on fund boards. The SEC also pushed into 
the opaque and largely unregulated world of hedge funds by 
requiring their registration with the agency—eliciting protests that 
this was the first step towards more comprehensive regulation. 
Under SEC pressure and with its approval, the stock exchanges 
further stiffened their listing rules on board independence and use 
of independent board auditing, nomination, and compensation 
committees.71  
None of these initiatives proved as controversial as the board 
nomination rules proposed by the SEC in October 2003 (Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2003b). Earlier, in May 2003, the 
agency had solicited comments on the subject from “interested 
parties,” in anticipation of proposing a rule on the subject 
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003a). The reaction was 
immediate. Hundreds of comments poured in from business 
groups, professional associations, corporate attorneys and law 
firms, institutional investment funds, and shareholder advocates. 
By the time the comment period closed on the proposed rules the 
SEC had received over 13,000 comment letters, by far the largest 
number regarding any rule in the Commission’s history (Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2004; Peterson, 2004a). 
                                            
71 Chandler and Strine, both judges of Delaware’s powerful and enormously 
influential Court of Chancellery, note (2002: n.12) that the listing rules are a de 
facto component of federal securities regulation and, increasingly, of the 
federalization of corporate governance law more broadly. They go on to argue, in 
the context of a defense of Delaware’s corporation law and doctrine, that 
Sarbanes-Oxley does not expand the SEC’s powers over firms’ internal 
governance affairs or over exchange listing rules. (Id.: n. 57) The statute’s 
provisions regarding independent directors and board committees, at a 
minimum, suggest the opposite, but they are correct to raise the question of 
how far the SEC’s authority now extends. 
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The proposed proxy rules would have allowed institutional 
investors access to corporate proxies mailed to all shareholders 
only after substantial delays and under exceptional conditions. 
The proposed rules would create a two-step, multi-year process to 
place shareholder board nominations on the corporation’s formal 
proxy ballots. First, at least 35% of voting shareholders would 
have to withhold their support for a company's director candidate 
in an annual board election. If this criterion is satisfied, a group 
representing at least 5% of shares would be able to nominate and 
run its own nominee(s) on the corporate proxy the following year. 
Even then, the proposed rules would allow dissident shareholders 
to elect no more than a minority of three directors in this fashion. 
This is almost certainly insufficient to substantially change the 
functioning of boards and suggests that corporate boards, however 
restructured, will remain ineffective as checks on managerial 
power.  
The ferocity of opposition to the SEC’s rather feeble proposal 
indicates the extraordinary sensitivity of board nomination and 
election rules and the strength of the gathering managerial 
backlash. Whereas divisions enfeebled interest groups and 
empowered policymakers during the debate over Sarbanes-Oxley, 
they were now far more unified—and polarized. Managers, 
business groups, and allied organizations attacked the proposed 
rules as destructive of corporate efficiency and an invitation to 
public and union pension to use their vast holdings to conduct 
divisive campaigns and pursue special interest agendas. Both the 
Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce publicly 
opposed the rules, with the Chamber threatening to sue if they 
were adopted. Institutional investors, unions, shareholder and 
consumer advocates, and a number of state treasurers publicly 
supported the changes, but some argued that the proposed rules 
were too weak to make a practical difference in who oversees the 
county’s largest corporations (Peterson, 2004a).  
 The conflict escalated in the run up to the 2004 presidential 
election. Opponents intensified their attack on the proposed rule 
while the Bush administration reportedly weighed in against it 
54 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 02 NO. 01 
 
 
behind closed doors.72 The SEC commissioners themselves split 
over the issue, with the Democratic and Republican 
commissioners increasingly bitterly divided at 2-2. Donaldson, 
denouncing the “escalating, shrill, and fearful rhetoric” of interest 
group battle, largely sided with the Democrats in support of the 
rule, but sought a compromise that neither side supported 
(Johnson, 2004a). By July 2004, Donaldson conceded that the SEC 
was deadlocked over the board nomination proposal (Labaton, 
2004b; Peterson, 2004b). Its fate would turn on the election 
(Peterson, 2004c).  
Proponents of the board nomination reforms saw their last chance 
for such a fundamental reform slipping away. They knew a Bush-
GOP victory would spell the end of the effort. The two 
Democratic SEC commissioners were due to step down after the 
election, and would almost certainly be replaced with 
commissioners less supportive of reform. A Bush victory would 
also leave the Republicans in the White House and Congress free 
to more directly attack the proposal. In an unusually vituperative 
public statement, Democratic Commissioner Harvey Goldschmidt 
attacked the managers who had fought the proposal to a standstill: 
“The commission's inaction to this point has made it a safer world 
for a small minority of lazy, inefficient, grossly overpaid and 
wrongheaded CEOs…the worst instincts of the CEO community 
have triumphed” (Peterson, 2004c). 
As soon as the November 2004 election ended in a Bush victory 
and an augmented Republican majority in the Senate, post-
mortems for the board nomination proposed started appearing in 
the news. By January 2005, news items reported that the plan was 
dead (Peterson, 2004d; Johnson, 2004b). Corporate governance 
reform reached its high-water mark, and it was left in a structural 
                                            
72 See Labaton, 2004a; see also Orol, 2004 (indicating the continuing internal 
ferment and uncertainty over the final form of the rule at the SEC). 
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state that preserved the institutional foundations of 
managerialism. The failure of the SEC’s proposal to give 
shareholders more power to nominate and elect corporate directors 
brought a brief era of reform to a close. Under intense pressure 
from administration and congressional conservatives, under fire by 
business groups, and his reform agenda criticized and blocked by 
increasingly hostile Republican SEC Commissioners, SEC 
Chairman William Donaldson faced a deteriorating and untenable 
political position. He resigned in early June, 2005. Within hours of 
Donaldson’s resignation, President Bush nominated Rep. Chris 
Cox—the principal author of the original House securities 
litigation reform legislation in 1995 and a vocal critical of 
regulation—to replace him. While Donaldson’s resignation as 
Chairman of the SEC formalized the end of the corporate 
governance era, the Cox nomination underscored the close 
structural and political connection between legislative curbs on 
securities litigation and the limits of corporate governance reform.  
The failure of the SEC’s proxy voting reforms suggests that 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s structural components will have a less 
significant impact on corporate governance and managerial 
behavior than their proponents hoped for and their critics feared. 
The benefits of board independence have long been the subject of 
intense academic debate.73 A long historical record of lackluster 
board performance by individuals working part time and with 
little knowledge of the details of a firm’s business has fueled the 
skepticism of many commentators towards claims that director 
and board independence would improve governance.74 Indeed, 
                                            
73 For critical reviews of this literature, see, e.g., Romano, 2004; Bainbridge, 
2002.  
74 A sizeable empirical literature, beyond the scope of this essay, casts doubts on 
the claimed benefits of independent directors. However, it should be noted that 
these critics assume that behavior patterns are static. Past patterns of conduct 
predict future ones regardless of contextual and institutional changes. It is quite 
possible that directors and boards will respond to the recent reforms and the 
new corporate governance environment by treating the position as more of a 
real job requiring relevant expertise, greater expenditures of time, and 
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empowering shareholders through board independence may 
reinforce the short-termism of American finance and corporate 
management and serve a primarily value extracting function by 
increasing returns without improving other measures of 
performance. In retrospect, not only have Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
structural reforms run aground politically on the status quo ante, 
they largely followed and reinforced the liberal market trajectory 
that has long characterized the American political economy and 
its financial system in particular. (See, e.g.,  Zysman, 1983: ch. 5) 
In this sense, the economic criticisms of corporate governance 
reform are beside the point. The reforms were shaped by political 
forces, not economic ones, just as politics maintained a flawed 
corporate governance regime that was so conducive to the 
financial scandals of the 1990s. These same political forces 
ultimately undermined the internal logic of structural regulation 
premised on board independence and shareholder representation. 
In the end, American managerialism has been modified by reform, 
yet it has demonstrated its political resiliency.   
VII. CONCLUSION  
Viewing the structural logic of securities law and corporate 
governance reforms stretching from the 1990s to the present, we 
can trace an enduring shift in American politics and regulatory 
policy. Hostility towards private litigation may have begun on the 
Republican right, but it achieved bi-partisan support that placed 
firm political limits on regulatory policymaking going forward. 
The problems of enforcement created by this aversion to litigation 
fostered an accelerating trend towards employing structural 
regulation that alters the structure of the corporate form and the 
internal operation of governance practices to address problems of 
governance. Paradoxically, this emphasis on structural regulation 
                                                                                                                
independent outside professional advice. Of course, such changes will raise the 
price of directors’ services. Scattered evidence suggests this may be happening 
in practice. 
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led policymakers to tinker with some of the most basic and 
sensitive power relations in any capitalist society in ways that 
blurred the division between the public and private spheres. 
However, this blurring of regulation of the structure of the 
corporate form triggered resistance that revealed the political 
limits of reform. Even at the height of the corporate governance 
crisis, the fundamental reform of corporate power structures, such 
as that implied by the SEC’s proxy reform proposal, was politically 
impossible. By failing to address how boards are actually 
nominated and elected, the corporate governance provisions of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, which rely so heavily on the independence of 
directors and board committees, were left with a weak foundation. 
The true political sensitivity of these structural aspects of 
corporate and managerial power became apparent in 2003 and 
2004 as the SEC set out on its ill-fated effort to reform the rules 
governing board elections left untouched by Congress in 2002.  
The failure of either Congress or the SEC to carry corporate 
governance reform to its logical conclusion (or where it should 
have started in the first place) by giving shareholders a meaningful 
role in nominating and electing directors highlights some basic 
characteristics of policymaking and reform politics in the United 
States. First, the very structure of the federal government and 
pluralist interest group politics makes it exceedingly difficult to 
pass major reform legislation under ordinary political and 
economic conditions. Second, crises provide the conditions that 
allow critics and reformers to break through the bottlenecks and 
veto points of politics as usual, but only for the usually brief 
duration of perceived emergency. Accordingly, reform and 
institutional development proceeds in a pattern of punctuated 
equilibrium, with periods of sudden, episodic, and crisis-driven 
reform led by state actors. Third, even under crisis conditions, 
structural and political constraints on policymaking do not 
disappear. Markets and the institutions on which they depend may 
fail, at times spectacularly, but the underlying dynamics of 
institutionalized interests and political constraints persist. 
Established patterns of interest group politics usually swiftly 
reassert themselves. When politicians expect that the enfeebled 
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condition of interest group politics is temporary, and that interest 
group politics as usual will soon return, powerful interest groups 
retain influence. Their most basic interests inform political 
constraints on policymakers who fear mobilizing a potent 
constituency on behalf of the opposition. Further, some issues are 
non-negotiable. Even when interest groups and their political allies 
are weakened, they will fight fiercely when fundamental interests 
are at stake. When they are willing to pay the short-term political 
price of using the machinery of government to block reform, these 
constraints harden and would-be reformers may not bother to 
openly challenge them.  
Corporate governance reforms in the United States exemplify this 
pattern of punctuated change within powerful, implicit, and 
largely unchallenged constraints. Senate Democrats never openly 
challenged the premises or policy of securities litigation reform or 
managerial control over board nominations and elections. The 
reformers on the SEC ran afoul of these constraints. Donaldson 
and the Democratic SEC Commissioners believed the reform 
momentum generated in 2001-2002 would persist for years, and 
gambled that it would permit them to pursue ever more 
fundamental structural changes. The struggle over the board 
nomination and election rules illustrates how corporate 
governance has become an important policy arena and partisan 
political issue, fought over with the intensity that belies its 
technical character. It also shows that politics is back to normal.  
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